JinkoSolar has reported its first annual loss since listing on China's A-share market, with a net deficit of RMB 6.786 billion yuan (US$933 million) for 2025, underscoring the severity of a prolonged price collapse that is reshaping the global solar industry's competitive landscape.

The loss, disclosed in a preliminary earnings announcement on Feb. 27, comes as photovoltaic module prices remain near historic lows, squeezing margins across the entire supply chain. Revenue fell 29.18% year-on-year to RMB 65.492 billion yuan, while the company's net loss attributable to shareholders swung from a profit to a deficit — a deterioration of 6,959.5% on a comparable basis.

The results arrive at a particularly precarious moment. On Feb. 24, U.S. solar manufacturer First Solar filed a Section 337 complaint with the International Trade Commission, naming JinkoSolar among 47 global manufacturers it accuses of infringing core TOPCon cell manufacturing patents. Given that overseas revenue has consistently accounted for more than half of JinkoSolar's total sales, the legal action adds a significant layer of uncertainty to a company already navigating its worst financial performance in years.

The broader industry is in parallel distress. Peers including Tongwei, TCL Zhonghuan Renewable Energy Technology, Jinko's rival Astronergy, and Jinko's direct competitor JA Solar Technology have all disclosed heavy losses for 2025, painting a picture of an industry in the grip of structural overcapacity.

Financials Deteriorate Across Every Key Metric

The scale of JinkoSolar's financial deterioration in 2025 is difficult to overstate. The company, which had maintained profitability for most of its history since a brief loss in 2012, saw losses accumulate across all four quarters of the year.

In Q1 2025, revenue fell 40.03% year-on-year to RMB 13.843 billion yuan, with a net loss of RMB 1.39 billion yuan. The situation worsened in Q2, when revenue declined 25.57% to RMB 17.988 billion yuan and the net loss widened to RMB 1.519 billion yuan — a year-on-year collapse of 6,336.82%. Q3 saw revenue drop a further 34.11% to RMB 16.155 billion yuan, with losses exceeding RMB 1 billion yuan for the quarter.

Profitability indicators were equally alarming. For the first three quarters of 2025, JinkoSolar's gross margin turned negative at -0.07%, a decline of 9.75 percentage points year-on-year, while the net margin fell to -8.21%, down 9.93 percentage points. Operating cash flow for the same period stood at negative RMB 1.341 billion yuan, a deterioration of 267.83% compared to the prior year.

By year-end 2025, total assets stood at RMB 119.159 billion yuan, down 1.61% from the start of the year, while equity attributable to shareholders of the parent company declined 21.19% to RMB 25.462 billion yuan. As of March 2, the company's market capitalization was approximately RMB 73.638 billion yuan, with its share price having fallen more than 20% from its intra-year high of RMB 9.66 to RMB 7.36.

The company attributed the losses primarily to the sustained decline in photovoltaic product prices, exacerbated by intensified trade protection measures in overseas markets and asset impairment provisions. Despite launching its "Flying Tiger 3" high-efficiency module and reporting rapid growth in its energy storage business, the low proportion of high-power products in its shipment mix and persistently depressed module prices prevented these initiatives from offsetting the broader industry headwinds.

Patent Litigation Threatens Overseas Revenue Pillar

Overseas markets have long been central to JinkoSolar's business model. From 2020 through the first half of 2025, international revenue accounted for between 58% and 81% of total sales. North America alone contributed 24.26% of total revenue in 2024, making it the company's second-largest market after China.

That overseas revenue base now faces a direct legal threat. First Solar's Section 337 complaint targets US Patent No. 9,130,074, which covers foundational TOPCon manufacturing processes including tunnel oxide layers and doped polysilicon layers. Eight JinkoSolar-affiliated entities were named in the complaint, including JinkoSolar Holding Co., Ltd., JinkoSolar Co., Ltd., Jinko Solar (Vietnam) Industry Co., Ltd., and JinkoSolar (U.S.) Inc.

The strategic significance of this litigation is amplified by the dominance of TOPCon technology in the current market. According to TrendForce, TOPCon cell capacity was projected to reach approximately 967 gigawatts by end-2025, representing 83% of global cell capacity, with actual output of around 580 gigawatts. Data from CITIC Futures indicates that as of March 2025, TOPCon accounted for 86.9% of China's photovoltaic cell production output.

JinkoSolar's exposure is particularly acute given its market position. According to InfoLink Consulting's 2025 global module shipment rankings, JinkoSolar tied with LONGi Green Energy Technology for the top position globally. Separately, research from Huajing Industry Research Institute placed JinkoSolar first in TOPCon module shipments. A successful ITC ruling against the company could restrict its ability to import TOPCon products into the United States, directly threatening its largest non-domestic revenue stream.

Industry-Wide Overcapacity Drives Structural Reckoning

JinkoSolar's results are symptomatic of a broader structural crisis in the global solar manufacturing industry. According to Huajing Industry Research Institute, nominal capacity across the entire photovoltaic supply chain exceeded 1,100 gigawatts in 2025, while global installation demand stood at only approximately 600 gigawatts — implying capacity redundancy of more than 1.8 times actual demand.

China, which supplies approximately 85% of global photovoltaic capacity, saw utilization rates fall below 60% across all segments. Polysilicon and module operating rates dropped to 47% and 48%, respectively. The silicon wafer segment recorded its first negative growth in nearly four years, with capacity contracting from 1,153 gigawatts in 2024 to 1,088 gigawatts in 2025, marking a structural shift from capacity expansion to market-share attrition.

The human cost of this consolidation has been substantial. In the first half of 2025 alone, more than 50 solar companies filed for bankruptcy liquidation, including 14 state-owned enterprises. Foreign players were not immune: German manufacturer Meyer Burger was also forced to shut down production facilities.

Among companies that have disclosed 2025 earnings guidance, Tongwei Stock Co. projected a loss of RMB 9 billion to RMB 10 billion yuan; TCL Zhonghuan forecast losses of RMB 8.2 billion to RMB 9.6 billion yuan; JA Solar Technology guided for losses of RMB 4.5 billion to RMB 4.8 billion yuan; and Trina Solar reported a net loss of approximately RMB 7 billion yuan for 2025. According to data compiled by PV Time, roughly 60% of listed solar companies across the supply chain remained in loss territory.

Leading Players Pursue Divergent Survival Strategies

Faced with a prolonged downturn, China's top-tier solar manufacturers are pursuing markedly different strategic responses, reflecting divergent assessments of how the industry will ultimately consolidate.

Tongwei and TCL Zhonghuan have turned to mergers and acquisitions as a means of securing scale advantages and market pricing power. On Jan. 16, TCL Zhonghuan announced plans to acquire a stake in Yidao New Energy through share transfers, proxy voting rights, and capital injection, accelerating its vertical integration strategy. On Feb. 24, Tongwei announced a suspension of trading pending a plan to acquire 100% of Qinghai Lihao Qingneng through a combination of share issuance and cash payment. Qinghai Lihao, founded in 2021, operates polysilicon production capacity ranked sixth in the industry, with more than 200,000 metric tons of high-purity crystalline silicon capacity in operation and an additional 100,000 metric tons under construction as of end-2025. Analysts suggest the transaction would lift Tongwei's total polysilicon capacity to approximately 1.11 million metric tons and raise its global market share to around 34%.

LONGi Green Energy has pivoted toward energy storage, leveraging integrated solar-storage system capabilities to differentiate its product offering and rebalance its global business mix. Aiko Solar is pursuing a technology-differentiation strategy centered on its ABC cell architecture, a bet that proprietary technology can insulate it from commodity-level price competition; it has guided for a narrowed 2025 loss of RMB 1.2 billion to RMB 1.9 billion yuan.

JinkoSolar, for its part, has taken targeted steps to rationalize its asset base. In 2025, the company divested Jinko New Materials — a loss-making subsidiary — at a premium of 299.08% over book value, with a transaction price of RMB 80 million yuan. The company has stated that the gain from this transaction is expected to represent more than 50% of its most recently audited annual net profit figure.

Looking ahead, JinkoSolar has expressed cautious optimism that the industry is entering a phase of quality-driven development, with supply-demand dynamics expected to rebalance. Whether that rebalancing materializes quickly enough to restore profitability — and whether the company can navigate the twin pressures of domestic price attrition and overseas legal exposure — will define its trajectory in 2026.